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ABSTRACT
Complex cyber-physical systems are typically hierarchically organized into multiple layers of abstraction in order to manage design complexity and provide verification tractability. Formal reasoning about such systems,
therefore, necessarily involves the use of multiple modeling formalisms, verification paradigms, and concomitant
tools, chosen as appropriate for the level of abstraction
at which the analysis is performed. System properties
verified using an abstract component specification in one
paradigm must then be shown to logically follow from
properties verified, possibly using a different paradigm,
on a more concrete component description, if one is to
claim that a particular component when deployed in
the overall system context would still uphold the system properties. But, as component specifications at one
layer get elaborated into more concrete component descriptions in the next, abstraction induced differences
come to the fore, which have to be reconciled in some
meaningful way. In this paper, we present our approach
for providing a logical glue to tie distinct verification
paradigms and reconcile the abstraction induced differences, to verify safety properties of a medical cyberphysical system. While the specifics are particular to
the case example at hand – a high-level abstraction of a
safety-interlock system to stop drug infusion along with
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CNS-0931931 and CNS-1035715.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
Copyright 200X ACM X-XXXXX-XX-X/XX/XX ...$5.00.

2

Department of Computer and Information Science
University of Pennsylvania
3330 Walnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA

a detailed design of a generic infusion pump – we believe the techniques are broadly applicable in similar
situations for verifying complex cyber-physical system
properties.

Keywords
Compositional verification, Model-based development,
Medical cyber-physical systems

1.

INTRODUCTION

Modern medical systems increasingly involve an array of interacting devices that communicate, coordinate
and control therapy delivery to patients. Critical safety
and efficacy properties of these cyber-physical systems
(CPS) are dependent not only on the individual components’ behaviors, but also on the overall CPS architecture that determines how these components are arranged and interconnected. This system decomposition,
when formalized, can be profitably exploited in stringing together individual components’ properties to establish top-level system properties. However, verification
at the system level is likely to heavily abstract component behaviors down to what is essential for showing
the system-level property. The component suppliers’ responsibility is then to show that a concrete realization of
a particular component indeed conforms to its abstract
specification used to establish critical system properties.
Such a top-down compositional approach to verification is quite appealing – allocation of verification burden parallels allocation of development burden. But, as
we descend down the system hierarchy, certain practical concerns surface that complicate the picture. First,
different specification formalisms, modeling notations,
and verification tools – the ones most appropriate for
the component being verified – are likely to be employed, which necessitates some logical glue to attach
the verification result of a lower-level component to its

abstract higher-level representation. Secondly, as details get progressively elaborated, abstraction induced
differences come to the fore which have to be somehow
reconciled.
In this paper, we describe such a compositional approach to verify safety properties of a closed-loop generic
patient-controlled analgesia infusion system. This prototypical system includes a patient blood oxygen level
monitor whose output is constantly monitored by a supervisory controller that can automatically command
the pump to terminate (pain medication) infusion, should
the oxygen-level fall below a critical threshold.
In prior works [23, 21], we have separately and independently described two approaches to respectively
verify (i) safety properties of the closed-loop system using timed automata models in UPPAAL that included
a physiological model of the patient in the loop, and
(ii) critical requirements of the infusion pump control
software using a compositional assume-guarantee reasoning approach on an AADL system architecture with
component behaviors elaborated in Simulink/Stateflow
models. A natural question then is whether these two
can be combined in some meaningful way such that the
particular infusion pump when used as part of closedloop system can be guaranteed to uphold critical safety
properties. We describe our present work here that affirmatively answers this question. We highlight the key
aspects of our approach for providing a logical glue to
tie distinct verification paradigms and for reconciling
the abstraction induced differences between the closedloop system and the infusion pump system. While the
specifics are particular to the case example at hand, we
believe the approach is broadly applicable in similar situations for verifying complex CPS system properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we provide a brief overview of the the medical
system case study and the Generic Patient Controlled
Analgesic (GPCA) infusion pump. In Section 3 we describe the details of the hierarchical system modelling
using different tools and notations - timed automata for
the top level medical system, architectural design language to represent the hierarchical architecture of the
system, and stateflow notation for modeling behavior of
the GPCA components. In Section 4 we explain the individual model verification using tools appropriate for
that modeling notation. We then demonstrate a formal hierarchical system verification of the medical system using the GPCA as a component. In the process
of formally bridging the differences, we followed certain
strategies and some limitations of the approach that we
discuss in Section 5. Following a brief discussion of related work in Section 6 we finally conclude this paper,
in Section 7, by summarizing our efforts, learning and
our next steps in this research direction.

2.

SYSTEM OVERVIEW

2.1

Closed Loop System

We considered the clinical scenario of Patient Controlled Analgesia (PCA). PCA is an approach to pain
control in post-operative patients, widely used in modern hospitals. A liquid pain medication, typically an
opiate such as morphine, is delivered by an infusion
pump that is equipped with a request button. The
pump delivers medication at a pre-defined low rate of
infusion, known as basal rate. Often, the basal rate is
insufficient to control pain. When the patient feels pain,
he or she can press the request button. The pump then
delivers an additional dose of medication, known as a
bolus, at a higher rate of infusion.

Figure 1: Overview of the closed-loop system
A serious side effect of opioid medication is that an
overdose can lead to a respiratory failure that can result in the death of a patient. Sensitivity to the medication varies widely within the patient population, and
can also be affected by the patient state. Therefore, the
right balance between achieving pain control and avoiding overdose is hard to achieve. For this reason, PCA
guidelines require the use of a sensor, typically a pulse
oximeter, that would allow the clinician to detect the
onset of respiratory problems. Pulse oximeters measure
SpO2 , the blood oxygen saturation. Low oxygen saturation indicates that the patient is breathing strongly
enough to supply lungs with oxygen. In the current
practice, the caregiver manually adjusts the pump settings after the pulse oximeter raises an alarm. As the
caregiver is typically responsible for a number of patients, there may be a delay before he or she responds
to an alarm. For this reason, the quality of care may be
improved by a closed-loop system illustrated in Figure 1,
where a safety interlock device continuously monitors
the pulse oximeter readings and stops the pump once a
pre-set threshold is crossed.

2.2

Generic Patient Controlled Analgesic Infusion Pump

Infusion pumps have been involved in many incidents
that have resulted in harm to the patient [1]. The US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), through its Infusion Pump Improvement Initiative [1] has sought to
pro-actively promote the safe use of these devices by
establishing additional requirements for infusion pump
manufacturers.
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3.1

Prescription

The key patient safety questions that need to be answered for the closed loop system is whether the pump
will always be stopped, and whether it will be stopped
quickly enough. There are several delay factors in the
control loop. First, human physiology imposes a delay
from the time the drug concentration reaches a dangerous level and the time the effects of an overdose becomes apparent in the oxugen saturation levels. In modeling the physiology, we utilize a simplified model of
pharmacokinetics of intravenous delivery of anesthetic
drugs presented in [5]. Second, there is a delay in the
pulse oximeter, which averages a number of samples in
a variable-size window to produce a reading [6]. Sensed
values and pump commands are transmitted over the
network, adding to the delay. Finally, the controller itself adds a processing delay to issue a command to the
pump.
In order to capture the essential functionality of the
closed-loop system and perform analysis of timing properties of the system, we modeled the system components and interactions between them using UPPAAL [4].
An UPPAAL model is a collection of timed automata
that can communicate using synchronous channels and
shared variables. The architecture of the UPPAAL model
follows closely that of the system in Figure 1. The PCA
infusion pump is represented by three automata, which
we discuss in more detail below. The model also includes an automaton representing patient physiology, an
automaton for the pulse oximeter, an automaton capturing the logic of the safety interface, and a network
automaton. For details of the model, we refer the reader
to [23].
The three automata used to model the pump that
correspond to the three essential properties of the pump.
The first property states that Infusion cannot begin until
parameters of the infusion are configured and pump is
started by the caregiver. The second property specifies
basal rate delivery. It states that if the pump is not
stopped, it delivers medication with at least the basal
rate and otherwise the infusion rate is 0. Finally, the
third property specifies bolus delivery. It states that,
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Figure 2: GPCA Device
In order to contribute to this initiative by providing an archetype of system development artifacts for
a Generic Patient Controlled Analgesia Infusion Pump
(GPCA) system, we modeled and verified an elaborate
generic PCA infusion pump, as shown in Figure 2. Unlike the abstract PCA pump in the closed loop system,
the GPCA we considered is richer in functionality, such
as multiple modes of drug infusion, prescription validation, drug library, variety of system response to hazards
depending upon their severity, visual and aural notifications, logging capability, routine system checks etc. At
a high level, the GPCA primarily has three functions
(1) Deliver the drug based on the prescribed schedule
and patient requests, (2) Prevent hazards that may arise
during its usage by monitoring and notifying the clinician of any hazardous conditions encountered and (3)
Respond to the commands received.

3.

to be reused. Hence it is natural to choose different notations to model and analyse the system at different
layers of abstraction. However, in most cases the modelling and analysis efforts are kept isolated within the
layers of abstraction and there is often an informal notion of correspondence. In this section we describe our
approach of modeling systems at different levels of abstraction, starting from the closed loop system till the
software of the GPCA, using varied modeling notations
and our attempt to formally relate them, so that their
analysis can be hierarchically connected.

MODELING

Systems are naturally constructed in hierarchies and
models enormously help in the development process especially for critical systems. At higher levels of abstraction the concentration of modeling is to specify and
analyse the overall system functions and the component
details are heavily abstracted. But as the system is refined, the focus shifts from the overall system functions
to the particular component functions. The notations
used to represent the system at the higher levels of abstraction may not be appropriate at lower levels. Also
some components of the system may be readily available

Closed Loop System Modeling
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Figure 3: Infusion pump model in UPPAAL: (a) Basal infusion control (b) Bolus control
once the bolus is requested, medication is delivered at
the bolus rate for the prescribed duration. The timed
automata corresponding to the latter two properties are
shown in Figure 3.

3.1.1

GPCA Architectural Modeling

As a part of another related initiative, we developed
and analysed a generic PCA (GPCA) pump software
model that is functionality superior to the PCA considered in the closed loop system model.
In the work described in this paper, our goal was to
perform formalized hierarchical reasoning of the closed
loop system as it refined to a functionally rich infusion
pump model having the GPCA software that was already modeled. However, in order to reason in a hierarchical fashion, we need a hierarchical model, such that
the abstractions are captured in the hierarchy. Hence we
built an architectural model of an infusion pump using
AADL. AADL notation supports descriptions of both
hardware and software components and their interactions. AADL supports many of the constructs needed
to model embedded systems such as processes, threads,
devices (sensors and actuators), processors, buses, and
memory. Furthermore, it contains an extension mechanism (called an annex) that can be used to extend the
language to support additional features, such as requirements modeling. Also the GPCA software model was already modeled using AADL. Hence we choose AADL to
build the hierarchical architectural model of an infusion
pump.
The graphical representation of the architecture is
shown in Figure 4. The top most system in AADL,
PCA_Pump, have interfaces (inputs and outputs) that
match the PCA interfaces of the closed loop system
model (UPPAAL model). This was done so that there
the level of abstraction of the PCA_Pump in AADL is
same as the PCA of the closed loop system in UPPAAL
and the properties of the PCA_Pump in AADL are always
specified at the same level of detail as in the UPPAAL
model.

While modeling the interfaces we group the individual inputs and outputs based on different sources: such
as the PCA_Pump inputs, all infusion values from caregiver/clinician are grouped as CAREGIVER_IN; all commands to the pump are grouped as PUMP_CMDS_IN and
patient bolus inputs are grouped as PATIENT_IN. This
was done in order to simplify signal routing throughout
the model. This grouping of inputs was consistently
done for all components in all levels of system abstraction.
The architecture of the PCA_Pump component, consists
of typical infusion device components such as sensors
(GPCA_HW_Sensors), a controller/software component
(GPCA_SW) and actuators (GPCA_HW_Actuators). The
sensor component represents the device hardware that
receive inputs to the device and sense exceptional conditions such as user interface, flow rate sensor etc. The
actuator component represents the device hardware that
is responsible for the drug flow out of the device and the
device display. The software component is responsible
for the system control. Since we already modeled a detailed software model, we reused the GPCA_SW model.
In addition to the typical device components, we also
created interface components (GPCA_IP_Interface and
GPCA_OP_Interface) to match and route the inputs and
outputs between the abstract PCA_Pump and concrete
GPCA device.
From this point onwards, we refer to the high level
PCA_Pump as the abstract model and detailed GPCA
device model as the concrete model.
The concrete model has more inputs than the abstract
PCA_Pump model hence the interface component matches
some straightforward inputs, such as Pump_Stop of the
abstract model to Infusion_Cancel of the concrete model,
as well as suppress certain concrete model inputs so
that the behaviours of the concrete model not required
by the abstract model never occur. For example, the
concrete model implements a functionality of suspending infusion in response to a Infusion_Pause command

Figure 4: GPCA Device Architecture

from the clinician. However the abstract model does
not specify this functionality. Hence the interface suppresses the Infusion_Pause command to the device.
Similarly other inputs and system conditions of the concrete model that are not specified by the abstract model
are abstracted by the interfaces.

3.1.2

GPCA Software Architecture

As mentioned earlier in the paper, we reused an existing model of the software (GPCA_SW). The software
component (GPCA_SW) was by far the most complicated
component. Hence developing it as one monolithic component was difficult to maintain as well as its verification
was not scalable [21]. Hence it was decomposed further
into sub-components as shown in Figure 5. To remove
clutter from the figure, we do not show connections from
the sub-components to the component boundary; the inputs and outputs of the subsystems are connected to the
inports and outports of the system with the same name.
This decomposition of the software was specified as an
implementation of the GPCA_SW component similar to
the decomposition of PCA_Pump. Once the GPCA_SW was
decomposed into sub-components, it was tractable for
analysis hence no further decomposition was necessary.
For details of the model, we refer the reader to [21].

3.2

erally not the most suitable and preferred notations
to model system behaviors. Hence for each of software’s sub-component we modeled its detailed behavior
using MathWorks Simulink [2] and Stateflow [3] tool.
Simulink is a data flow graphical language for modeling and simulating dynamic systems (both the language
and the tool are referred to as Simulink). Stateflow is a
state-based notation used to model state machines and
flow charts (again, Stateflow also refers to the tool).
These tools are by far the most widely used notations
in industry and suits our modeling needs well. These
individual behavioral models allowed us to analyse and
verify the behaviors in a manageable fashion. For details
of the model, we refer the reader to [21].

4.

VERIFICATION

Our strategy for verifying properties over models that
span multiple abstraction levels is depicted in Figure 6
using the closed-loop infusion system as the case example. The main idea is to use the notation and tools appropriate for each abstraction level, decompose the single verification problem into distinct verification tasks
for each level of abstraction, and finally tie together the
results in a logical fashion that is amenable to manual
review.

Behaviorial Modeling

The architectural models just defines the structure of
components and their connections. They do not specify anything about the components behaviors. However, it was necessary to understand, analyse and verify
behaviors elaborately. In our opinion, AADL is gen-

4.1

Verification Approach and Tools

For the verification effort of the GPCA model, we
used three different model checking tools. For the timed
automata model verification, we used UPPAAL model
checker. For the architectural verification, we used the

Figure 5: GPCA Software Architecture
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true oxygen saturation. Note that the invariant of the
stopped state in the PCAbasal automaton is pca_rate==0,
implying that no drug is entering the patient. The
second property takes into account the fact that the
stopped pump can be restarted manually by the caregiver. We show that if the caregiver never restarts the
pump when the patient is in danger, the patient eventually recovers, with the oxygen saturation levels returning to normal. This property is expressed as an UPPAAL query as samplebuffer < 90 -> samplebuffer
>= 91.

4.3

Reasoning about GPCA Architectural Models with AGREE

AADL is supported by a growing number of tools, including tools that support editing and import/export of
AADL models, as well as tools that allow one to analyze different aspects of the model—correctness of the
1
connections, component resource usage within limits,
recently developed Rockwell Collins JKind tool . For
etc. However, AADL does not have a built-in means
the behavioral model verification, we used the Simulink
of associating requirements with different components
Design Verifier (SLDV) [19]. Both the JKind and SLDV
within the architecture, nor does it have support reatools use k-induction [24] algorithms implemented on
soning about requirements.
top of a Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver [12]
To formally argue that the system satisfies its reto reason about infinite-state models involving real (raquirements,
assume-guarantee contracts [20] provide an
tional) numbers and bounded or unbounded integers.
appropriate mechanism for capturing the information
needed from other modeling domains to reason about
4.2 Closed Loop System Verification
system-level properties. In this formulation, guaranWe proved two essential closed-loop safety properties.
tees correspond to component requirements, and asThe first one states that, once the patient’s blood oxysumptions correspond to the environmental constraints
gen saturation level becomes lower than 90%, the pump
that are used in verifying the component requirements.
will eventually be stopped, expressed as an UPPAAL
query as samplebuffer < 90 -> PCAbasal.stopped. Here, A contract specifies precisely the information that is
needed to reason about the component’s interaction with
samplebuffer is a shared variable that represents the
other parts of the system. Furthermore, the contract
1
mechanism supports a hierarchical decomposition of the
Available at: https://github.com/agacek/jkind
Figure 6: Multi-model verification

verification process that follows the natural hierarchy in
the system model.
In our work, we use AGREE framework [8] - a compositional reasoning framework based on assume-guarantee
contracts. AGREE is a plugin to the OSATE AADL
tool and adds support for requirements capture and formal verification of the architectural models. In AGREE,
we use the past-time operator subset of past-time linear
temporal logic (PLTL) [17] to specify contracts. The
language is based on Property Specification Language
(PSL) [16] and defines a Lustre language [14] flavor for
the PSL Boolean layer expressions and definitions.
AADL distinguishes between a system, which describe
the input/output interface of an AADL aggregate, and
system implementations, which describe the internal structure of the system. Each system type may have several
implementations. We define requirements contracts in
a system because requirements are defined over the input/output interface of the component and should not
be defined in terms of implementation details. However,
we perform proofs at the system implementation level,
where we can use the contracts of subcomponents and
their architectural relationship to establish system level
properties.
For each layer of the architecture, we establish, for
each implementation of a system, that the implementation meets the requirements of the system defined in
the layer. Transitively, we thus establish that the requirements of the top-level system are proved given that
the properties of the lowest layer leaf-level components
are true. The structure of contracts is the same for
the subcomponents, though of course the interfaces and
properties are specialized to the functionality of each
subcomponent.
In order to formally link the closed loop PCA to the
architectural models, we recaptured the closed loop PCA
properties as AGREE contracts at the PCA_Pump level
in AADL.
Lets take an example to explain the hierarchical steps
of verification. A closed loop level property for the PCA
informally states, Infusion cannot begin until parameters
of the infusion are configured and pump is started by
the caregiver. This requirement recaptured as AGREE
contract is,
property no_infusion_start =
true -> pre(PUMP_DISPLAY_OUT.Current_System_Mode)=1
and (not(CAREGIVER_IN.Infusion_Start
and CAREGIVER_IN.Infusion_Programmed)) =>
(PUMP_DISPLAY_OUT.Current_System_Mode = 1);}

In the above formalism, the Current_System_Mode =
1 represents the current pump state (abstractly represented as mode 1) in which flow rate is always zero. The
pre(PUMP_DISPLAY_OUT.Current_System_Mode) represents the value of the variable from the previous step.

An astute reader might have noticed the ”true->” in the
property, which means the property is always true in the
first step. This was intensionally done, since we noticed
that using ’pre’ in the first execution step returned random value. . Hence in order to avoid complication in
specifying the property, we split the property into two,
where we first specify that the pump always starts (that
at the first execution step) in state at which flow is zero
and then starting the second step, the above mentioned
property holds. This was made just to make the property writing straightforward.
In order for the above property of PCA_Pump to hold,
its components, should compositionally guarantee using
their properties. The GPCA_SW being a component of
PCA_Pump has much richer functionality than the functionalities specified by PCA_Pump. Hence state mapping
between them was required to write GPCA_SW properties to guarantee PCA_Pump properties. Figure 7 shows
a high level representation of the states and its mapping between the systems. The state representation of
PCA_Pump was derived from the UPPAAL model and
that of GPCA_SW was derived from its behavioral specifications. Similar to the state mapping, the transitions
from and to these states were also mapped. We discuss
the details of the mapping later in this paper.
In order to satisfy the PCA_Pump property, certain assumptions were required at the PCA_Pump level to match
the abstractions. First of all, CAREGIVER_IN.Infusion_
Programmed - specifies if a valid prescription is already
programmed in the pump - was mapped to the concrete
model variable (PUMP_DISPLAY_OUT.Configured > 0)
that means the device holds a valid prescription. At the
PCA_Pump level, these were still abstract concepts since
the caregiver decides if the infusion is programmed by
looking at the pumps’s display and determining if it is
configured. Hence we state this as an assumption at the
PCA_Pump level.
Secondly, we mapped the ON->Programmed and Stopped
of the abstract model to IDLE state of the concrete
model hence the transitions (ON->Programmed)->Running
triggered by (CAREGIVER_IN.Infusion_Start and CAREGIVER_IN.Infusion_Programmed) and the transition Stopped
-> Running triggered by (CAREGIVER_IN.Clear_Command)
were assumed to imply each other.
Thirdly, GPCA IP Interface maps the abstract model’s
Infusion_Start input signal with the concrete model’s
Infusion_Initiate command. Finally the GPCA_SW
guarantees that,
property no_enter_therapy =
true ->
pre(GPCA_SW_OUT.Current_System_Mode) = 1
and not(OP_CMD_IN.Infusion_Initiate
and GPCA_SW_OUT.Configured > 0) =>
(GPCA_SW_OUT.Current_System_Mode = 1);

There were a few other component guarantees that
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Figure 7: Abstract PCA and Concrete GPCA High level system state mapping

deal with mapping inputs and outputs that are not discussed here since its not a significant point of discussion.
Hence when we compositionally verified the PCA_Pump
property in AGREE, it was guaranteed using their component guarantees and system assumptions.
At this point, the satisfaction of the properties were
only until the GPCA Device components level. As discussed in section 3.1.2, the GPCA_SW was further decomposed into components. Hence the properties guaranteed by the GPCA_SW for the PCA_Pump has to be guaranteed by its sub-components. We performed another
level of AGREE reasoning in which now the GPCA_SW is
the top level system that has properties to be guaranteed (similar to the PCA_Pump) by its components (TLM,
ALARM, IM...) guarantees. For example, the property of the GPCA_SW (property no_enter_therapy)),
is guaranteed by Infusion Manager(IM), Configuration
Manager (CONFIG), and Output (OUTPUT) component
guarantees. There were not as many assumptions and
abstraction mapping required for the property guarantee between the GPCA_SW and its components since they
were already done as a part of another initiative. For
more details on the verification between the GPCA_SW
and its components, we refer the reader to [21].

4.4

SLDV

The required properties of the software components
captured in AGREE used to guarantee the GPCA_SW,
which in turn were used to guarantee the PCA_Pump.
However, in order to verify if the software components
captured in AGREE indeed hold, we used the detailed
behavioral model of each of these components built using Simulink/Stateflow and verified using Simulink Design verifier that they satisfy their properties. The Simulink
Design Verifier requires all properties to be specified as
Boolean expressions in one of the available MATLAB
notations. Hence in our work, we recapture the required component properties in embedded Matlab - a
subset of the MATLAB computing language that sup-

ports efficient code generation for deployment in embedded systems. For more details on the behaviorial
modeling verification, we refer the reader to [21].

5.

DISCUSSION

In total, 7 PCA_Pump properties were proved in AGREE
that correspond to the abstract timed automata model
of the PCA. In order to guarantee these 7 system properties, there were 7 GPCA_IP_Interface properties and
11 GPCA_SW properties along with some auxiliary properties of the GPCA_HW_Sensors, GPCA_HW_Actuators and
GPCA_OP_Interface to pass through the input and output signals. Similarly the 11 GPCA_SW properties were
in turn guaranteed by 4 properties in ALARM, 11 properties in IM and 6 properties in CONFIG, which are the
sub-components of GPCA_SW.

5.1

Matching Abstractions

To ensure that the infusion pump used in the closedloop system model simulates the concrete GPCA model,
the differences in the two abstractions had to be reconciled by formally matching states, transitions and inputs. The concrete GPCA model has many inputs,
states and transitions that are not represented in the
abstract model. We addressed this by associating concrete infusion modes with abstract states of the infusion
pump, introducing a non-deterministic input in the abstract model and adding environmental assumptions in
the concrete model.
First we established a mapping between states in the
abstract model of the infusion pump and the infusion
modes of the concrete GPCA model, as show in Figure 7. This enables restating properties specified in
terms of flow-rate constraints at the abstract level as
properties in terms of the infusion modes. The different GPCA infusion modes have specific associated
flow-rates that can be immediately verified for conformance to flow-rate constraints. In this mapping, the
abstract states Stopped, ON and Programmed are asso-

ciated with the IDLE mode represented by the predicate Current_System_Mode = 1; Running is associated with BASAL and OTHER BOLUS modes represented
by Current_System_Mode ∈ {2, 3}; and BOLUSING is associated with PATIENT BOLUS represented by Current_
System_Mode = 4. Note that there is no abstract state
associated with the PAUSED mode of the GPCA, which
denotes a temporary halt to infusion due to certain exceptional conditions identified by the alarm sub-system.
Certain environmental assumptions, to be discussed shortly,
are sufficient to guarantee that this mode is not reached
for the scenarios considered.
Second, the abstract closed-loop system modeled the
“stop” command to the pump as an exclusive input from
the supervisory control for oxygenation-level based safetyinterlock. However, realistically the operator may command the GPCA to stop at any time – one may view the
operator as an external monitor for exceptional conditions, analogous to the internal monitor represented by
the ALARMS component. Unlike infusion pump alarms,
which are excluded from consideration at the abstract
level, the “stop” command was included in the original abstract model, albeit for a restricted purpose. By
allowing the “stop” to occur non-deterministically, one
can easily simulate an externally commanded infusion
stoppage. The Pump_Stop input signal was made nondeterministic in the abstract model to effect this change.
The GPCA monitors various exceptional conditions as
modeled by the ALARMS component and responds appropriately, some of which would include a temporary pause
to infusion. These alarms may be triggered by sensor
inputs such as air-in-line or internally computed conditions such as empty-reservoir. Due to this, even a simple abstract property, Once the pump is started, unless
it is stopped, the drug flows at least at basal flow rate,
does not hold for the concrete model, because, the property presupposes the absence of infusion-ending triggers
other than the stop command. In the closed-loop system, the abstract infusion pump model rightly disregards such details; at the abstract level, one is interested
in establishing essential system properties using a simplified notion of an infusion pump. The responsibility
for stopping infusion for any reason can be pushed out
to the environment – in this case the pump operator can
be assumed to command infusion stoppage as necessary.
Therefore, when relating abstract infusion pump properties to a concrete realization of the pump, it is reasonable to interpret those as being prefixed with a standard
caveat: “Absent exceptional pump conditions that internally trigger stoppage of infusion . . . ”. Of course, what
these exceptional conditions are would vary with particulars of the specific pump under consideration. In the
process of mapping the abstract infusion pump model
and its properties to the concrete GPCA, absence of

these internally triggered exceptional conditions is captured as a system assumption, (no_cancel_implies_no_stop_conditions). Such assumptions must then
be discharged using properties of the environment in
which the GPCA operates. In the present case, one has
to manually review these assumptions to ascertain that
those are acceptable caveats to the property of interest.
This is a desirable outcome, for it clearly calls attention
to what those exceptional conditions could be for the
specific GPCA device.
Finally, in the concrete model, there are more more
modes of active drug infusion than the ones specified
in the abstract model as shown in Figure 7. Originally
the abstract model’s property was, when the system is
started and not stopped, system infuses at BASAL flow
rate (when there is no patient bolus request). But the
concrete model switches between BASAL and OTHER BOLUS based on the prescription. There were multiple ways
to reconcile the differences. A straightforward approach
is to assume that there is no prescribed OTHER BOLUS.
However, this is not a reasonable assumption for the scenarios under consideration – the essential system properties must hold for any infusion scenario. Therefore, we
adopted an alternative route: the abstract property was
modified to state that system infuses at no less than the
BASAL flow rate”. With an assumption that any bolus
infusion delivers drug at a rate higher than the BASAL
flow rate, which is typically true of the problem domain, this change allows the possibility of multiple drug
delivery modes with different flow rates even when the
abstraction includes only a few specific modes explicitly.
Apart from these changes, some auxiliary properties
were required to guarantee that the concrete model’s
states and transitions that were not represented by the
abstract model are not reachable given the system assumptions and the abstraction mapping. For example, the concrete model has an additional state PAUSED
shown in Figure 7. Thus, an auxiliary property to show
that PAUSED is never reached under the given environmental assumptions is needed.
In summary, the goal of this matching process augmented with property verification is to justify the following claims:
1. Every abstract state, input and output in the abstract infusion pump model has some matching
counterparts in the concrete model
2. States, inputs and outputs of interest in the concrete GPCA have some matching counterparts in
the abstract model
3. Transitions between such matched states on matched
inputs in the concrete GPCA model have a corresponding matching transition in the abstract model
and the respective outputs match

-- UPPAAL Property :if the pump is not stopped, it delivers medication with at least the basal rate
property infusion_continue =
true -> (pre(PUMP_DISPLAY_OUT.Current_System_Mode) >= 2 and pre(PUMP_DISPLAY_OUT.Current_System_Mode) <= 4) and
not(PUMP_CMDS_IN.Pump_Stop) =>
(PUMP_DISPLAY_OUT.Current_System_Mode >= 2 and PUMP_DISPLAY_OUT.Current_System_Mode <= 4);
guarantee "infusion_continue":infusion_continue;
-- Map modes with flow rates.
guarantee "Mode 1":(PUMP_DISPLAY_OUT.Current_System_Mode = 1) => (DRUG_OUT.Drug_Flow_Rate = 0);
guarantee "Mode 2":(PUMP_DISPLAY_OUT.Current_System_Mode = 2) =>
(DRUG_OUT.Drug_Flow_Rate >= CAREGIVER_IN.Normal_Infusion_Rate);
guarantee "Mode 3":(PUMP_DISPLAY_OUT.Current_System_Mode = 3) =>
(DRUG_OUT.Drug_Flow_Rate >= CAREGIVER_IN.Normal_Infusion_Rate);
guarantee "Mode 4":(PUMP_DISPLAY_OUT.Current_System_Mode = 4) =>
(DRUG_OUT.Drug_Flow_Rate = CAREGIVER_IN.Bolus_Infusion_Rate);
....
....
-- Maps pump stop input of abstract model to Infusion cancel of concrete model
guarantee "Pump Stop means Infusion cancel" : (PUMP_CMDS_IN.Pump_Stop <=> OP_CMD_OUT.Infusion_Cancel);
....
....
-- sensor conditions that cause infusion to be stopped.
eq sensor_conditions_that_cause_pause:bool =
(SENSOR_OUT.Battery_Depleted or SENSOR_OUT.RTC_In_Error or SENSOR_OUT.CPU_In_Error or
SENSOR_OUT.Memory_Corrupted or SENSOR_OUT.Pump_Too_Hot or SENSOR_OUT.Watchdog_Interrupted or
SENSOR_OUT.Temp or SENSOR_OUT.Humidity or SENSOR_OUT.Air_Pressure or
SENSOR_OUT.Air_In_Line or SENSOR_OUT.Occlusion or SENSOR_OUT.Door_Open);
-- when there is no infusion cancel, then there is no sensor conditions causing infusion stop occurs.
property no_cancel_implies_no_stop_conditions =
not(OP_CMD_IN.Infusion_Cancel) => not(sensor_conditions_that_cause_pause);
assume "no_cancel_implies_no_stop_conditions" :no_cancel_implies_no_stop_conditions;
....
....
-- If there is no infusion cancel then there is no condition stopping infusion.
property no_cancel_implies_no_stop_conditions =
not(OP_CMD_IN.Infusion_Cancel) =>
not(infusion_end_conditions or any_alarms or OP_CMD_IN.Infusion_Inhibit);
assume "no_cancel_implies_no_stop_conditions" :no_cancel_implies_no_stop_conditions ;
-- If the system is in ACTIVE, and if there is no conditions to stop infusion,system will be in ACTIVE.
property in_active =
true ->
(pre(GPCA_SW_OUT.Current_System_Mode) >= 2 and pre(GPCA_SW_OUT.Current_System_Mode) <= 4) and
not(OP_CMD_IN.Infusion_Cancel) =>
(GPCA_SW_OUT.Current_System_Mode >= 2 and GPCA_SW_OUT.Current_System_Mode <= 4);
guarantee "in_active": in_active;

Figure 8: Portions of AGREE properties at different layers of system abstraction

4. Unmatched concrete inputs do not occur given certain environmental assumptions
5. Unmatched concrete states are not reachable under
those environmental assumptions
Informally speaking, taken together these claims allow us to see the abstract infusion pump model as a
stand-in (simulation) for the concrete GPCA model under the given environmental assumptions. Thus safety
properties that are established for a system model that
uses the abstract infusion pump as a component, in a
way that satisfies the environmental assumptions made
in the matching process, will be upheld when the concrete GPCA infusion pump is substituted in place of the
abstract pump.

5.2

Limitations

Our current approach to verification is restricted in
several ways. First, AGREE currently only handles
synchronous architectural models in which execution
proceeds in a deterministic discrete sequence of steps.
Second, AGREE can verify only invariants, so liveness
properties, cannot be specified in AGREE. In our experience, this is not as severe a limitation as it may seem,
since most systems are concerned with bounded liveness
in which an action must occur within a time interval
that can be written in AGREE.
The current analysis tools use rationals to model the
behavior of real numbers; However, most software is
implemented using floating point numbers. This can

lead to unsoundness in our analysis of software that uses
floating point arithmetic. Also, AGREE does not support trigonometric or non-linear functions. These can
be approximated in some cases, but many of the interesting numeric properties of systems simply cannot be
specified.

6.

RELATED WORK

Formal analysis of medical systems.
Modeling and analysis of closed-loop medical systems
have been primarily studied in the context of diabetes
care. Much attention is given to modeling patient physiology and design of algorithms for glucose control; see,
for example, [26, 7]. However, we are not aware of any
studies, where evaluation of the closed-loop system is
tied to the modeling of medical devices that comprise
the system. A closed-loop safety interlock for PCA infusion, similar to the one studied in this paper, has been
proposed in [9], however, the authors do not show any
analysis results. Similarly, the GPCA pump has been
used in a number of case studies that involved a variety of formal methods to model different aspects of the
pump behavior. In [18], code for a simple infusion controller has been generated from UPPAAL-verified code.

Multi-formalism modeling.
In the context of multi-formalism modeling, work has
been done to develop frameworks to integrate models
specified using different formalisms. For example, The
Möbius approach [11], provides a comprehensive infrastructure to support interacting formalisms and solvers.
However the formalisms and solvers are required to be
described in terms of a predefined framework and only
those formalisms that can be mapped to the tool’s underlying predefined common semantics can be used. Similarly, The OsMoSys approach [25] and AToM3 [10],
requires the formalism (restricted to graph based formalisms) to be defined in terms of an XML based metalanguage. The main drawback of these approaches is
requiring the formalism to be definable/mappable using
a common semantics/rules. This restricts the freedom
of the designer to the model in the notation that most
suitable for representing and analysing the system and
its components.
An important aspect of relating models in different
formalisms is the notion of time. Timed automata used
to model the closed-loop system use continuous time,
while behaviors of the AADL model rely on discrete
time. The usual way of reconciling the discrepancy between the notions of time is through discretization. A
number of techniques for discretization have been developed in the literature, such as [13, 15]. Our UPPAAL
model satisfies the conditions put forth in [22], which

guarantee that whenever a transition is enabled during
an execution, it can occur at an integer-valued time instance. Thus, the model can be faithfully simulated in
discrete time.

7.

CONCLUSION

When systems are composed from sub-systems, properties of the system must be assessed based on its component properties and the composition. To reason about
such systems, no single analysis and modeling method
can successfully cope with all aspects of a system or its
components. Hence multiple notations and formalisms
are used. An approach to logically glue the diverse analysis of the system and its components is required to
reason about the system properties.
In this paper, we considered compositional verification
of a medical system at multiple levels of abstraction,
with different formalisms used at each level. We were
able to formally glue distinct verification paradigms by
leveraging the system’s hierarchical architectural decomposition. We showed how properties proved for the system components at the lower levels of abstraction can
be used to validate the more abstract models, ensuring
that properties proved at the higher levels of abstraction
remain satisfied.
While techniques used in this paper are specific to the
example at hand and to the formalisms used within the
case study, we believe that this work can form the basis for a general, scalable and practical approach to layered verification of properties in complex cyber-physical
systems. In order to fully realize the promise of this
approach, we are currently working to make the approach more systematic and eliminate the ad hoc aspects we used in this work. We are also making the
approach more general, allowing more formalisms be incorporated.
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safety properties using induction and a sat-solver.
In W. A. H. Jr. and S. D. Johnson, editors,
FMCAD, volume 1954 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 108–125. Springer, 2000.
V. Vittorini, M. Iacono, N. Mazzocca, and
G. Franceschinis. The osmosys approach to
multi-formalism modeling of systems. Software
and Systems Modeling, 3(1):68–81, 2004.
S. Weinzimer, G. Steil, K. Swan, J. Dziura,
N. Kurtz, and W. Tamborlane. Fully automated
closed-loop insulin delivery versus semiautomated
hybrid control in pediatric patients with type 1
diabetes using an artificial pancreas. Diabetes
Care, 31(5):934–939, May 2008.

